The recent flurry of news reports regarding the administration of high street retail chains and the subsequent sale of parts of their businesses is perhaps an opportune time to flag up the renewed importance that the hypothec plays in Scottish property law.

By virtue of the hypothec, in insolvency, a landlord automatically obtains a fixed charge ranking on the proceeds of sale of the moveable goods of the tenant that are on the premises as at the point of insolvency, up to the value of any arrears of rent.

Agreements with administrators often contain provisions to the effect that any claim against the company in administration will rank only as an unsecured claim and not as an expense of the administration. Although such provisions are common, there has always been some doubt as to their efficacy.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently issued an opinion in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC¹ in which it found, among other things, that the assignment of voting rights from a junior creditor to a senior creditor pursuant to an intercreditor agreement was unenforceable. The opinion was rendered in connection with the court’s decision to confirm the plan proposed by the debtor, the owner of the W Hotel in Boston.

Background

Recently, the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's decision in the Nortel Networks and Lehman Brothers disputes. The judgment confirms that liabilities under Financial Support Directions (FSDs) and Contribution Notices (CNs), which are issued by the Pensions Regulator, will rank ahead of almost all other claims when a company becomes insolvent. The discussions in the case focused on whether FSDs and CNs are classed as 'provable debts', expenses of the insolvency or, indeed, neither.

In Finnerty v Clark, the Court of Appeal has given guidance on what constitutes "good and sufficient" grounds for the removal of administrators. In this case, shareholders of a company in administration were also substantial creditors of the company. They wished the administrators to raise proceedings under Section 244 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (extortionate credit transactions) to challenge loan agreements that had been entered into by the company prior to administration.

The recent case of Stephen Petitioner offers some clarification regarding issues relating to the validity of appointment of administrators.

The Facts

The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in Picard v. Katz, et al., (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC),1 which limits avoidance actions against a debtor-broker’s customers to those arising under federal law based on actual, rather than constructive, fraud. The decision was issued by US District Judge Rakoff in the Trustee’s suit against the owners of the New York Mets (along with certain of their friends, family and associates).

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a cross-affiliate netting provision in an ISDA swap agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy. In the SIPA proceedings of Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), UBS AG (UBS) sought to offset UBS’s obligation to return excess collateral to LBI against claims purportedly owed by LBI to UBS subsidiaries, UBS Securities and UBS Financial Services.

Sections 216 and 217 of the Insolvency Act impose draconian sanctions on directors of liquidated companies who reuse "prohibited names". Prohibited names are names that are identical to, or "suggest an association with", a company that has gone into liquidation and of which they were previously directors. The sanctions include criminal penalties and personal liability for debts. It has always been difficult for advisers to confidently advise directors whether a proposed name for a new company would be a prohibited name, given the vague nature of the phrase "suggest an association".

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that redemptions of commercial paper made through the Depositary Trust Company (DTC) are entitled to the “safe harbor” protections afforded to settlement payments under Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), and are, therefore, not preferential transfers, even though such payments were made prior to maturity.1 The Second Circuit is the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address the issue, which arises out of the Enron bankruptcy case.

Legal Framework