In recent weeks, the dispute in Windstream’s bankruptcy between Windstream and its REIT spinoff Uniti Group over the lease transaction that ultimately led to Windstream’s chapter 11 bankruptcy has continued to escalate with Windstream filing an adversary complaint against Uniti. In its complaint, Windstream seeks to recharacterize the lease as a disguised financing alleging that the lease resulted in a long-term transfer of billions of dollars to Uniti to the detriment of Windstream’s creditors.
On April 23, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in fraudulent transfer litigation arising out of the 2007 leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company,1 ruled on one of the significant issues left unresolved by the US Supreme Court in its Merit Management decision last year.
On February 25, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision holding that a trustee is not barred by either the presumption against extraterritoriality or by international comity principles from recovering property from a foreign subsequent transferee that received the property from a foreign initial transferee.
On January 17, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a decision holding that “impairment” under a plan of reorganization does not arise even if a creditor is paid less than it would be entitled to under its contract, so long as the reduced recovery is due to the plan’s incorporation of the Bankruptcy Code’s disallowance provisions.
Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.
On November 8, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) issued a decision dismissing an involuntary chapter 11 case filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a CDO, by holders of non-recourse notes (the “Petitioning Creditors”).
Parties involved in cross-border bankruptcy/restructuring situations may be wary of the risk that repeated litigation in different courts with jurisdiction over the same debtor will result in conflicting judgments. The principle of “universalism” is the theory whereby the decisions of one primary jurisdiction addressing a debtor’s bankruptcy/restructuring issues are given universal effect by courts in other jurisdictions.
Intercreditor agreements--contracts that lay out the respective rights, obligations and priorities of different classes of creditors--play an increasingly important role in corporate finance in light of the continued prevalence of complex capital structures involving various levels of debt. When a company encounters financial difficulties, intercreditor agreements become all the more important, as competing classes of creditors seek to maximize their share of the company's limited assets.
On September 21, 2018, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve the nonconsensual third-party releases contained in the debtor’s plan of reorganization. The District Court also dismissed as equitably moot all other issues raised on appeal by the appellant in connection with the confirmation order.
The consummation of a plan of reorganization typically involves a series of complex actions by the debtor and its stakeholders (for example, existing debt and equity are extinguished and new debt and equity issued in their place). If an appeal of a confirmation order is taken, and the appeal reaches the appellate court following consummation of the plan, it raises the difficult question of whether it is possible to grant effective relief to the appellant at that stage. As a constitutional matter, courts — including appellate courts — cannot hear matters that have become moot.