Introduction
For more than a century, a creditor holding English law governed debt relied on the principle (known as the “rule in Gibbs ”) that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged by a foreign insolvency proceeding, provided that the creditor does not submit to that proceeding.
When any industry faces challenging times, thoughts turn to what might happen to those companies which are unable to maintain their solvency and service their existing debt.
Removal of requirement for sanction
Previously under section 165 IA 86, liquidators in a voluntary winding up would have to seek sanction of the company (in members’ voluntary liquidation) or of the court or liquidation committee (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) in order to exercise their powers to pay debts, compromise claims etc. SBEEA removes this requirement so that liquidators can exercise those powers freely. This will aid expeditious winding up of companies. Equivalent provisions have also been put into place for trustees in bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court (unanimously dismissing the appeal in Trustees of Olympic Airlines SA Pension &Life Assurance Scheme v Olympic Airlines SA) has held that “economic activity” is central to the definition of “establishment” in the Insolvency Regulation1.
The Court has heard another case dealing with a defective appointment of administrators under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 (“Schedule B1”)1. Following hot on the tail of a recent series of conflicting cases relating to defective appointments, the Court has held that:
In the much anticipated decision of Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 38 the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed the appeal of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (“LBSF”) and in so doing provided clarification as to the scope and application of the anti-deprivation rule (the “Rule”).
In a recent case1, the High Court concluded that it was right to sanction schemes of arrangement which formed part of a wider debt restructuring that excluded out-of-the-money junior creditors. In doing so, it valued the distressed companies on a going concern basis.
Background