This article was first published for Thomson Reuters' Practical Law Dispute Resolution Blog.
This article was first published in Insolvency Intelligence 2017, 30(5), 85-87.
In an earlier edition of this publication I identified what appeared to be a growing trend for the making of a draconian form of order suspending the discharge of bankruptcies. This form of order is typically associated with the case of Mawer v Bland where Mrs Justice Rose upheld on appeal the following order made by Chief Registrar Baister:
Facts
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.
On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,1 in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.
Introduction
The recent bankruptcy filings by infrastructure companies Connector 2000 Association Inc., South Bay Expressway, L.P., California Transportation Ventures, Inc., and the Las Vegas Monorail Company have tested the structures utilized to implement public-private partnerships (P3s) in the United States in several respects. It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of these proceedings on P3 structures going forward, but initial rulings in two of the cases are already focusing the minds of project participants on threshold structuring considerations.
In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.
To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.