On April 23, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in fraudulent transfer litigation arising out of the 2007 leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company,1 ruled on one of the significant issues left unresolved by the US Supreme Court in its Merit Management decision last year.
Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
On Jan. 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a bankruptcy court decision awarding Ultra Petroleum Corp. noteholders $201 million in make-whole payments and $186 million in post-petition interest. Under the note agreement, upon a bankruptcy filing, the issuer is obligated for a make-whole amount equal to the discounted value of the remaining scheduled payments (including principal and interest that would be due after prepayment) less the principal amount of the notes.
After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As
In the first article of this two-part series on sell-side opportunistic engineering in the CDS market, we surveyed a number of strategies that could be used by sellers of CDS protection to create sell-side gains. In this second part, we analyze two recent situations where a proposed refinancing dramatically affected the CDS market for the reference entity because of the reduction in the sell-side risk. Although these cases may or may not have been driven by CDS considerations, they illustrate how sell-side CDS strategies may be effectively implemented.
Over the past few years, the CDS market has seen an increase in activism and the evolution of creative refinancing and restructuring strategies intended to achieve particular outcomes in the CDS market.
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
Part 1 of this series described the recent decision of the ISDA Americas Determinations Committee to declare that a “failure to pay” had occurred with respect to iHeartCommunications Inc., notwithstanding that the only non-payment had been to a wholly owned subsidiary. The non-payment was orchestrated to avoid a springing lien that would have been triggered had all the notes of a particular issue of iHeartCommunications debt been paid in full. It did not reflect on the creditworthiness of iHeartCommunications.
On June 28, 2016, Judge Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Bank of America National Association, et al.(Adv. Proc. No. 10-03547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.