On April 23, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in fraudulent transfer litigation arising out of the 2007 leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company,1 ruled on one of the significant issues left unresolved by the US Supreme Court in its Merit Management decision last year.
Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.
On September 25, 2012, Judge D. Michael Lynn for the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas held that a “tail provision” for professional fees rendered prepetition survived – and was not cut off by – the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, Case No. 10-43400-DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012).
Background
On May 30, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court in one federal district lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a debt was discharged under a chapter 11 plan confirmation order issued by a bankruptcy court in another federal district. Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia, 1:10-cv-20509-KMM, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10891 (11th Cir. May 30, 2012). The decision makes it clear that a debtor must seek enforcement of its discharge order in the same federal court that granted the discharge in the first place.
On May 4, 2012, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the Bankruptcy Court has the injunctive power to enforce the automatic stay against entities falling within the Bankruptcy Court’s in personam jurisdiction, and that, in this case, the enforcement of the automatic stay did not violate interests of comity. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 Civ. 8629 (JPO), 2012 WL 1570859 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012).
On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,1 in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.