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The SIPC Trustee for Lehman Brothers Inc. ("LBI") and the Joint Administrator of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) ("LBIE") today announced an agreement in principle to resolve all claims, approximately $38 billion in the aggregate, between their respective entities.

The proposed settlement is subject to approval by the bankruptcy court in the United States and the English High Court. According to the LBI Trustee, if approved, "the agreement sets the stage for distributions that will provide 100 percent recovery of customer property."

The United States Supreme Court unanimously[1] held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid their debt at an asset sale conducted under a so-called "cramdown" plan. RadLAX Gateway Hotels, LLC et al., v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC),__S.Ct.__ No. 11-166, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012).

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,1 in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.

The recent bankruptcy filings by infrastructure companies Connector 2000 Association Inc., South Bay Expressway, L.P., California Transportation Ventures, Inc., and the Las Vegas Monorail Company have tested the structures utilized to implement public-private partnerships (P3s) in the United States in several respects. It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of these proceedings on P3 structures going forward, but initial rulings in two of the cases are already focusing the minds of project participants on threshold structuring considerations.

In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.

Break-up fees1 remain difficult for initial (or so-called “stalking horse”) bidders to obtain in the Third Circuit. In Kelson Channelview LLC v. Reliant Energy Channelview LP (In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP), No. 09-2074 (3d Cir. Jan.

To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.