On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The Productivity Commission published its final report on Business Set-up, Transfer and Closure on 7 December 2015. A copy of the final report is available here.
The final report recommends a number of changes to Australia's corporate insolvency laws and follows public consultation on the Productivity Commission's draft report released in May 2015.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).
On 25 July 2014 and 17 September 2014 respectively, Justice Brereton of the Supreme Court of NSW delivered two related judgments in Re AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liquidation) andRe AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liquidation) (No 2). The decisions deal with the evergreen topic of Liquidator remuneration and expenses.
Importantly, in fixing the Liquidators' remuneration, Justice Brereton adopted a "value" focussed approach, and discussed the relevance of considering matters beyond simply time spent multiplied by fixed hourly rates.
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
The importance of notifications to potential defendants and directors of the insolvent company
The decision in Re Octaviar Administration Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 786 highlights two key issues for insolvency practitioners:
On August 2, 2012, in the case ofIn re MBS Management Services, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a retail electricity agreement with a real estate management company constituted a forward contract protected by the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).
Introduction
On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.