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Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As

Background and Summary

The English scheme of arrangement (“Scheme”) has found particular utility throughout the European Union (the “EU”) and internationally as a restructuring tool for both foreign and UK companies alike. Providing creditors with access to a court sanctioned compromise procedure (which can be used prior to formal insolvency), the Scheme has combined flexibility with a high degree of commercial and procedural certainty for all involved, including creditors.

Europe has been a hot bed of legislative reform in the R&I space since the GFC. This panel discussed where some of the key jurisdictions had ended up in this process, in some cases, making significant changes to allow greater flexibility of treatment and efficiencies of process. Led by Philip Hertz (Clifford Chance), Lucas Kortmann (RESOR), Angel Martin (KPMG) and Dr Leo Plank (Kirkland & Ellis) discussed processes available in the UK, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany and some impending changes.

The consideration of the issues relating to TOPOIL begins in one of the three breakout sessions. This one considers whether some sort of restructuring process is appropriate and if so which might be the top options and their relative merits.

On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,1 in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

The recent bankruptcy filings by infrastructure companies Connector 2000 Association Inc., South Bay Expressway, L.P., California Transportation Ventures, Inc., and the Las Vegas Monorail Company have tested the structures utilized to implement public-private partnerships (P3s) in the United States in several respects. It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of these proceedings on P3 structures going forward, but initial rulings in two of the cases are already focusing the minds of project participants on threshold structuring considerations.