As the controversy around the possible sale of the Detroit Institute of Arts’ collectioncontinues to swirl, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr has given some of his most pointed comments to date about his expectations.
An important qualifier to the discussion about deaccessioning and the Detroit Institute of Arts is that although DIA is a subdivision of the bankruptcy debtor (Detroit), that debtor is not any old commercial entity. Rather, Detroit is a municipality, and municipal and state debtors are governed by slightly different rules than private parties.
The recentfiling by the City of Detroit for bankruptcy—the largest such municipal filing in history—has brought with it an unexpected art law twist. Namely: to what extent can, or should the collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts be used to satisfy the city’s creditors. As one might expect, the differences between what the city can do, what it should do
On Friday, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, Division of Banking closed Ravenswood Bank, headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, and appointed the FDIC as receiver for the bank.
Yesterday, the Special Inspector General for the Trouble Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) released a report criticizing the Treasury Department’s role in the accelerated closure of hundreds of GM and Chrysler dealerships.
On Tuesday, the Bank of Spain released details regarding the status of the restructuring of the Spanish savings bank sector, in what it called “the biggest overhaul of the Spanish banking sector in recent history.” The Bank also provided details regarding funding for bank restructurings supplied by the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB),
Yesterday, the U.K. Treasury announced that it had published a report setting out detailed proposals for the effective management and resolution of failed investment banks.
Today, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held a hearing to discuss the role of bankruptcy and antitrust law in financial regulatory reform, particularly with respect to institutions that may be regarded as “too big to fail,” as highlighted during the financial crisis.
Testifying before the Subcommittee were the following witnesses:
Panel I