Courts disagree over whether a foreign bankruptcy case can be recognized under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code if the foreign debtor does not reside or have assets or a place of business in the United States. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit staked out its position on this issue in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), ruling that the provision of the Bankruptcy Code requiring U.S. residency, assets, or a place of business applies in chapter 15 cases as well as cases filed under other chapters.

The Bankruptcy Code bars certain individuals or entities from filing for bankruptcy protection, generally because they do not reside or have a place of business or property in the United States, fail to satisfy certain debt thresholds, or are business entities, such as banks and insurance companies, subject to non-bankruptcy rules or regulations governing their rehabilitation or liquidation.

Determining a foreign debtor's "center of main interests" ("COMI") for purposes of recognizing a foreign bankruptcy proceeding in the United States under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code can be problematic in cases involving multiple debtors that are members of an enterprise group doing business in several different countries. The U.S.

"Comity" is a principle of jurisprudence whereby, under appropriate circumstances, one country recognizes within its borders the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation. Many recent court rulings have examined the indispensable role of comity in the context of foreign bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings that have been "recognized" by U.S. courts during the two decades since the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, U.S.

In most cases seeking recognition of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding in the United States under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the foreign debtor's "foreign representative" has been appointed by the foreign court or administrative body overseeing the debtor's bankruptcy case.

This week’s TGIF takes a look at the recent case of Mills Oakley (a partnership) v Asset HQ Australia Pty Ltd [2019] VSC 98, where the Supreme Court of Victoria found the statutory presumption of insolvency did not arise as there had not been effective service of a statutory demand due to a typographical error in the postal address.

What happened?

This week’s TGIF examines a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court which found that several proofs had been wrongly admitted or rejected, and had correct decisions been made, the company would not have been put into liquidation.

BACKGROUND

This week’s TGIF considers Re Broens Pty Limited (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747, in which a liquidator was held to be justified in making distributions to creditors in spite of several claims by employees for long service leave entitlements.

What happened?

On 19 December 2016, voluntary administrators were appointed to Broens Pty Limited (the Company). The Company supplied machinery & services to manufacturers in aerospace, rail, defence and mining industries.

This week’s TGIF considers the recent case of Vanguard v Modena [2018] FCA 1461, where the Court ordered a non-party director to pay indemnity costs due to his conduct in opposing winding-up proceedings against his company.

Background

Vanguard served a statutory demand on Modena on 27 September 2017 seeking payment of outstanding “commitment fees” totalling $138,000 which Modena was obliged, but had failed, to repay.

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2018] WASCA 163 provides much needed clarity around the law of set-off. The decision will no doubt help creditors sleep well at night, knowing that when contracting with counterparties that later become insolvent they will not lose their set-off rights for a lack of mutuality where the counterparty has granted security over its assets.