In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

This week’s TGIF considers a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Forex Capital Trading Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Invesus Group Limited [2024] NSWSC 867). Justice Ball determined that admission of a proof of debt by a liquidator was not akin to a judgment or settlement, and that such an admission did not create a new liability of the company.

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (In the matter of Pacific Plumbing Group Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2024] NSWSC 525), Justice Black determined that a payment made by a third party was not an unfair preference because the payment did not diminish assets available to creditors.

Key Takeaways

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

The Federal Court in Morgan, in the matter of Traditional Values Management Limited (in liq)[2024] FCA 74, approved an abridged process that allowed the liquidator to admit debts of a group of unsecured creditors without requiring a formal proof of debt.

Key Takeaways

The debt purchaser in In re McIntosh argued that because it was enforcing a debt that was not listed correctly on the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules, it was entitled to assume the debt had not been discharged. The U.S.

On January 2, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed an amicus curiae brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to reverse a district court’s decision finding that a debt collector lacked the requisite knowledge and intent to violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when it sent a debt-collection communication prior to any knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

In this week’s TGIF, we consider ASIC v Bettles [2023] FCA 975 and ASIC v Jones [2023] WASCA 130, two cases which bring into focus the conduct of insolvency practitioners and alleged abrogation of their duties and independence.

Key takeaways