In its recent decision in Walton v ACN 004 410 833 Limited (formerly Arrium Limited) (in liquidation) [2022] HCA 3 (Walton), the High Court of Australia held, in a split decision, that the mandatory public examination power contained in section 596A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) could be used by eligible applicants to examine directors and other officers of a company in external administration, including senior management, external administrators and trustees, about the company’s affairs for the broad purposes of enforcing and promoting comp

On 12 September 2018, the High Court of Australia (High Court) gave judgment in the case of Mighty River International Limited v Hughes (Mighty River).1 In that decision, the High Court (by a 3:2 majority) held that a “holding” deed of company arrangement (DOCA) is valid.

In brief

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

On 31 January 2017, Brereton J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in In the matter of OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Limited (administrators appointed) [2017] NSWSC 21 declared that the interests of Alleasing Pty Limited as lessor of a certain crusher and spare parts had vested in OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Limited, effectively giving ownership of the leased assets to the insolvent estate to be realised for the benefit of creditors generally after the company mistakenly registered the financing statements against Onesteel’s ABN rather than its ACN.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

Snapshot

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.