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On 26 February 2019, HMRC launched a consultation entitled “Protecting your tax in insolvency”, on the government’s proposal to make HMRC a secondary preferential creditor for taxes paid by employees and customers (the new powers are contained in the proposed Finance Bill 2019-20).

The securities safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) does not protect allegedly fraudulent “transfers in which financial institutions served as mere conduits,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 27, 2018. Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 WL 1054879, *7 (2018). Affirming the Seventh Circuit’s reinstatement of the bankruptcy trustee’s complaint alleging the insolvent debtor’s overpayment for a stock interest, the Court found the payment not covered by §546(e) and thus recoverable. The district court had dismissed the trustee’s claim.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

The safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §546(e) does not protect “transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on July 28, 2016. FTI Consulting Inc. v. Merit Management Group LP, 2016 WL 4036408, *1 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016).

The European Commission has published the VAT gap report for 2013 for 26 member states (Cyprus and Croatia are not included). The VAT gap is an estimate of VAT lost due to fraud and evasion, avoidance, bankruptcies/insolvencies and miscalculations. According to the report, VAT revenue collection in 2013 failed to show significant improvement across member states compared with 2012.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

The American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 issued today a 400-page report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”). The Report is the result of a two-year effort by 150 practitioner-ABI members.[1] Without considering the likelihood of Congressional passage in the near term, we will evaluate each significant proposed change separately in subsequent Alerts over the next several weeks.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 16, 2014, held that a “good faith transferee” in a fraudulent transfer suit “is entitled” to keep what it received “only to the extent” it gave “value.” Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Management), 2014 WL 5293705, at *8 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2014). Reversing in part the district and bankruptcy courts, the Fifth Circuit narrowed their holding that the debtor had “received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the debtor’s cash transfers.” Id. at *1-2.