Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

On February 17, 2016, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) (collectively, the “agencies”) jointly proposed a rule to supplement the statutory provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” or “OLA”) that govern the orderly liquidation of a “covered broker or dealer”—i.e., an SEC-registered broker or dealer that is a member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and for which a systemic risk determination to trigger the application of the OLA has been made.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has announced that the agenda for its board meeting next Tuesday, January 18, 2011, will include discussion regarding a “Final Rule Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.”

Title II of the Act, designated "Orderly Liquidation Authority" – effective July 21, 2010 – establishes what is intended to be an orderly liquidation process for "financial companies" whose collapse or potential collapse are determined to constitute a risk to the financial system as a whole. Such systemically significant institutions would be liquidated under these new procedures, rather than being treated under existing bankruptcy laws. (The intent of Act is that most-failing financial companies will continue to be administered under existing bankruptcy laws.)

A recent decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the terms of an engagement letter demonstrates the need to clearly articulate the intended purpose and scope of an engagement. As the case described below demonstrates, if there is any ambiguity with regard to whether or not a fee must be paid and/or when an engagement is terminated, the resolution of such ambiguity may depend upon the description of the engagement’s purpose.