In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

The immediate effect of Jevic will be that practitioners may no longer structure dismissals in any manner that deviates from the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of impaired creditors.

In today's low interest rate environment, the difference between a contractual interest rate and the federal judgment rate can be quite significant. It is not surprising, therefore, that this issue has become hotly litigated in cases involving solvent Chapter 11 debtors. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Colfin Bulls Funding A v. Paloian (In re Dvorkin Holdings), 547 B.R. 880 (N.D. Ill.

The Supreme Court again will be addressing the powers of bankruptcy courts. At the end of the term, the Court granted certiorari in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. to decide whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a way that violates the statutory priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (S. Ct. June 28, 2016). The Supreme Court is expected to address this fundamental bankruptcy issue sometime early next year.

Background

Puerto Rico is in the midst of a ­financial crisis. Over the past few years, its public debt skyrocketed while its government revenue sharply declined. In order to address its economic problems and to avoid mass public-worker layoffs and cuts in public services, the unincorporated U.S. territory issued billions of dollars in face value of municipal bonds. These bonds were readily saleable to investors in the United States due to their tax-exempt status and comparatively high yields.

One of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a debtor with a fresh start. The discharge of prepetition debts at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case is one of the most important ways to attain this fresh start.  On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court made it harder for debtors to obtain a fresh start by broadening an exception to discharge.

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its opinion in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, Case No. 15-145.

Earlier this year, we covered Judge Shelley Chapman’s ruling in the Sabine bankruptcy, permitting the Debtors to reject a handful of gathering and other midstream agreements. Previously, Judge Chapman permitted rejection on the grounds that the Debtors exercised their reasonable business judgement in doing so.

Adding to the unsettled body of case law on the enforceability of prepetition waivers of the automatic stay, on April 27, 2016, the U.S.

In In re Zair, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49032 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York became the latest to take sides on the emerging issue of “forced vesting” through a chapter 13 plan. After analyzing Bankruptcy Code §§ 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5), the court concluded that a chapter 13 debtor could not, through a chapter 13 plan, force a mortgagee to take title to the mortgage collateral.

Background