On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

The Bankruptcy Protector

This term, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan has authored a pair of opinions related to arbitration. The first of these decisions, Badgerow v. Walters, 20-1143, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022) came down on March 31, 2022, where Justice Kagan, writing for the 8/1 majority, held that a court must have an independent basis of federal jurisdiction to undertake a petition to confirm or vacate an arbitration award.

Section 105 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, titled “Power of Court,” is often cited and used as a “catch-all” provision when requesting certain relief or when a bankruptcy court enters an order granting (or denying) certain relief not prescribed by a particular provision of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides that a “court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title . . .

Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a framework through which a debtor can elect to either assume or reject an executory contract. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory,” courts utilize various tests to determine if a debtor can assume a contract—and thus be obligated to perform—or reject a contract—and thus the contract is deemed breached immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing date. The Countryman test is overwhelmingly the most commonly applied test to determine a contract’s executory nature.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion that calls into question the long-held Barton doctrine following the dismissal of a bankruptcy case and thus the jurisdiction of that court. In Tufts v. Hay, No. 19-11496 --- F.3d ----, 2020 WL 6144563 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020), the court considered where a litigant may bring suit against counsel appointed by a bankruptcy court after the bankruptcy case was dismissed.

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.

The Second Circuit ruled last week in Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, No. 18-1079 (2d Cir. 2020) that a Lehman Brothers affiliate cannot claw back $1 billion in payments made pursuant to swap agreements that were terminated when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and certain of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The panel concluded that the Bankruptcy Code provides a safe harbor for the liquidation of such swap agreements and also the distribution of proceeds from the collateral.

On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for