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Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of any chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic (but not universally accepted) principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

Protections added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1988 that give some intellectual property (“IP”) licensees the right to continued use of licensed property notwithstanding rejection of the underlying license agreement do not expressly apply to trademark licenses. As a consequence, a trademark licensee faces a great deal of uncertainty concerning its ability to continue using a licensed trademark if the licensor files for bankruptcy.

In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., 2014 BL 13998 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014), leave to app. denied, 2014 BL 33749 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014), certification denied, 2014 BL 37766 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2014), a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor's ability to credit bid its debt in connection with the sale of a hybrid car manufacturer's assets.

Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts below, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012), held that a debtor could assign insurance policies to an asbestos trust established under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding anti-assignment provisions in the policies and applicable state law.

Asbestos Trusts in Bankruptcy

In the case of Coughlin v. South Canaan Cellular Investments, LLC, C.A. No. 7202-VCL (Del. Ch. July 6, 2012), Respondents made a request for fee shifting under the bad-faith exception to the American Rule.  In reviewing this fee shifting request, the Court found that Respondents’ request itself was unfounded, and coupled with Respondents’ own conduct in the case, instead awarded Petitioner his fees in costs in the amount of $17,906.

In the case of Wagamon v. Dolan, C.A. No. 5594-VCG (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2012), the Court of Chancery reviewed Defendant William Krieg’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 56.  This dispute involves the winding up of a joint venture, Internet Working Technologies, Inc. (“INT”) owned by Allan Wagamon and David B.

In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re American Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of section 562 of the Bankruptcy Code, a discounted cash flow analysis was a “commercially reasonable determinant” of value for the liquidation of mortgage loans in a repurchase transaction.  

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, lost by a 5-4 margin Round 2 of its Supreme Court bout with the estate of E. Pierce Marshall in a contest over Vickie's rights to a portion of the fortune of her late husband, billionaire J. Howard Marshall II. The dollar figures in dispute, amounting to more than $400 million, and the celebrity status of the original (and now deceased) litigants may grab headlines.