On April 5 and June 8, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed bills (the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017 ("FIBA") and the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017) that would allow financial institutions to seek protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Competing claims to goods are common where there is an unpaid seller with alleged retention of title, the supplier’s customer has gone into external administration and the goods are in the possession of a transport or warehouse provider. Thrown into the mix may be an administrator or liquidator demanding possession of the goods to sell them.
In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
The recent case of M Webster Holdings Pty Limited (administrators appointed) v Specific Freight Pty Limited [2017] FCA 269 illustrates how a transport provider can become ‘the meat in the sandwich’ when a consignee of goods becomes insolvent.
Webster, a fashion retailer, operated two well-known Australian businesses, David Lawrence and Marcs. Webster was placed into administration in February 2017 and its administrators continued to trade with a view to securing a purchaser.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
On 23 March 2017, Justice Robson of the Supreme Court of Victoria declined to follow the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Re Enhill, finding that the decision was not binding with respect to different legislation (the Companies Act 1961 (Vic) as opposed to theCorporations Act 2001 (Cth)).
Background
Since the early 1980s, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in the decisions of Re EnhillPty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 561 and Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liq) (1983) 33 SASR 99.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
On 17 March, in Hambleton v Finn [2017] QDC 61, McGill SC DCJ of the District Court of Queensland applied the section 553C(1) setoff under the Corporations Act 2001 to a liquidator’s insolvent trading claim against a director.
His Honour followed the earlier decision of the District Court of Queensland in Morton v Rexel Electrical Supplies Pty Ltd. In that case, the set-off provision was applied where the liquidator was seeking the recovery of unfair preference payments.
When a lessee fails to comply with a notice to remedy a non-payment or other lease default, the lessor may be entitled to terminate the lease and retake possession of the property. This is commonly done by changing the locks.
However, a lessee who wants to save itself from being evicted can apply to court to prevent the lessor from retaking possession. In Queensland this application is made under section 124 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and is known as an application for relief against forfeiture.
When is relief against forfeiture granted?