In cases under both chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and its repealed predecessor, section 304, U.S. bankruptcy courts have routinely recognized and enforced orders of foreign bankruptcy and insolvency courts as a matter of international comity. However, U.S. bankruptcy courts sometimes disagree over the precise statutory authority for granting such relief, because the provisions of chapter 15 are not particularly clear on this point in all cases.
In In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C., 2021 WL 1603608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2021), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed the interaction between purported setoff rights arising under investment agreements governed by Islamic law and the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbors protecting the exercise of non-debtors' rights under financial contracts.
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
Introduction
Good-Faith Defense to Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers
Stockbroker Liquidations Under SIPA
Madoff
The Second Circuit's Ruling
Outlook
On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides special protection for tenants if a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor was the lessor by giving the tenant the option of retaining possession of the leased premises. Although the provision clearly describes what rights a tenant has if it makes such an election, it does not unequivocally address the extent of the electing tenant's obligations under the rejected lease or any related agreements. The U.S.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to avoid fraudulent transfers is an important tool promoting the bankruptcy policies of equality of distribution among creditors and maximizing the property included in the estate.
In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.
In Short
The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to obtain credit or financing during the course of a bankruptcy case is often crucial to the debtor's prospects for either maintaining operations pending the development of a confirmable plan of reorganization or facilitating an orderly liquidation designed to maximize asset values for the benefit of all stakeholders. In a chapter 11 case, financing (and/or cash infusions through recapitalization) also is often a key component of the reorganized debtor's ability to operate post-bankruptcy.