The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear” of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of “any interest in such property,” has generated a fair amount of controversy.

In 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, which grants some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property notwithstanding rejection of the underlying executory license agreement by a debtor or bankruptcy trustee. The addition came three years after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), that if a debtor rejects an executory intellectual property license, the licensee loses the right to use any licensed copyrights, trademarks, and patents.

Participants in the multibillion-dollar market for distressed claims and securities have had ample reason to keep a watchful eye on developments in the bankruptcy courts during the last decade. That vigil appeared to have been over five years ago, after a federal district court ruled in the Enron chapter 11 cases that sold claims are generally not subject to equitable subordination or disallowance on the basis of the seller's misconduct or receipt of a voidable transfer. A ruling recently handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court, however, has reignited the debate.

The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.

On December 22, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware inIn re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II LLC ¹ dismissed with prejudice a mezzanine borrower’s bankruptcy case for bad faith under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the court clarified that the standard in the Third Circuit to evaluate the good faith of a debtor seeking shelter under the umbrella of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is an objective one and does not consider the subjective good faith of a debtor as do courts within the Secon d Circuit.

A "roller-coaster ride of financial and economic uncertainty" would be one way to describe 2011. Limiting the script to financial and economic developments, however, would leave a big part of the story untold, as we chronicle the (not so certain) aftermath of the Great Recession. Impacting worldwide financial and economic affairs in 2011 was a seemingly endless series of groundbreaking, thought-provoking, and sometimes cataclysmic events, including:

Much attention in the commercial bankruptcy world has been devoted recently to judicial pronouncements concerning whether the practice of senior creditor class “gifting” to junior classes under a chapter 1 1 plan violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “absolute priority rule.” Comparatively little scrutiny, by contrast, has been directed toward significant developments in ongoing controversies in the courts regarding the absolute priority rule outside the realm of senior class gifting— namely, in connection with the “new value” exception to the rule and whether the rule was written out of the Bankr

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

The enduring impact of the Great Recession on businesses, individuals, municipalities, and even sovereign nations has figured prominently in world headlines during the last three years. Comparatively absent from the lede, however, has been the plight of charitable and other nonprofit entities that depend in large part on the largesse of donors who themselves have been less able or less willing to provide eleemosynary institutions with badly needed sources of capital in the current economic climate.

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.