On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, addressing the question of whether a company can use bankruptcy to resolve the liability of non-debtor third parties. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and an injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge the claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. ____ (2024) holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the inclusion of non-consensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans. This decision settles a long-standing circuit split on the propriety of such releases and clarifies that a plan may not provide for the release of claims against non-debtors without the consent of the claimants.

Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

In its recent German Pellets decision, the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor could not assert its indemnification defenses in a suit brought by the trustee of a liquidation trust because the Chapter 11 plan’s express language permanently enjoined the defenses and the creditor chose not to participate in the debtor’s bankruptcy despite having actual knowledge of it.

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background

Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

On June 6, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed the chapter 11 plan of bedding manufacturer Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, "Serta"). In confirming Serta's plan, the court held that a 2020 "uptier," or "position enhancement," transaction (the "2020 Transaction") whereby Serta issued new debt secured by a priming lien on its assets and purchased its existing debt from participating lenders at a discount with a portion of the proceeds did not violate the terms of Serta's 2016 credit agreement.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.

Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.