The High Court sanctioned Madagascar Oil Limited’s restructuring plan, exercising cross class cram down. The judgment deals with a few now familiar points: what is the relevant alternative? Can it be a different deal? As well as touching on a few novel ones in an unusual two class only plan: was there in fact an in the money class enabling cross class cram down? Almost a third of the judgment is devoted to international recognition and effectiveness of the plan in Madagascar and Mauritius, an unusually detailed analysis, but required here given the specific facts of the case.
After a sluggish year in 2020 for mergers and acquisitions among hospitals and health systems, 2021 has shown renewed vigor and is poised for considerable transactional activity.
On 28 March 2020, the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, announced new insolvency measures to support companies under pressure as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. In summary, the government is due to: (i) implement the landmark changes to the corporate insolvency regime that were announced in August 2018 (as discussed in Weil’s European Restructuring Watch update on 7 September 2018); and (ii) temporarily and retrospectively suspend wrongful trading provisions for three months.
Proposed Changes to the Corporate Insolvency Regime
Background
On 6 March 2020, the restructuring of Doncasters Group's 1.22 billion funded debt was completed. Following a successful non-core disposals program, the Doncasters Group (a leading worldwide supplier of high quality engineered components for the aerospace, industrial gas turbine and specialist automotive industries) operates from 12 principal manufacturing facilities based across the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Mexico and China.
Over the last two years, BEIS has issued a number of consultations either focussed on, or touching upon, corporate governance issues in insolvency or the broader insolvency framework.
The year 2009 set a record for defaults and restructurings. Ownership of companies changed rapidly and, given the freeze up in capital markets, most of the new capital structures were significantly deleveraged, leaving little role for pre-existing sponsors and other equity holders of troubled companies. Halfway through 2010, even though actual bankruptcies have declined, restructuring continues through an amendment and forbearance process that is driven by the potential consequences to stakeholders in a court supervised restructuring.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.
The next few years will see the “redevelopment” of the law in two critical areas involving bank failures where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-tion (“FDIC”) is appointed receiver: (i) the relative rights and claims of creditors of a bank or savings and loan holding company, including the FDIC; and (ii) D&O and professional liability. Significant decisions are be-ginning to be issued with regard to the former.