When an employer is insolvent and administrators appointed, job losses are often an inevitable consequence. In this blog we look at the legal obligations arising where redundancies meet the threshold for collective consultation, and the implications for administrators arising out of the recent Supreme Court in the case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another.
When does the legal obligation to collectively consult apply?
On 24 February, the Government published draft regulations that, if implemented, will impose new restrictions on pre-pack administration sales to connected parties. For all `substantial disposals' (which will include `pre-pack' sales) to connected parties, taking place within eight weeks of the administrators' appointment, the administrators will either need creditor consent or a report from an independent `evaluator'.
Context
Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.
The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.
In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).