Liquidator remuneration in insolvency proceedings often raises difficult questions; especially in large corporate collapses where the work is extensive and the stakes are high. Courts must balance fair compensation with creditor protection, but approaches to fee assessment have varied across jurisdictions, leading to uncertainty and dispute.

When an employer is insolvent and administrators appointed, job losses are often an inevitable consequence. In this blog we look at the legal obligations arising where redundancies meet the threshold for collective consultation, and the implications for administrators arising out of the recent Supreme Court in the case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another.

When does the legal obligation to collectively consult apply?

On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

The English High Court case Duneau v Klimt Invest SA & Ors [2022] EWHC 596 (Ch) is perhaps the first decision where a public listed company was wound up under section 122(1)(g) of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 on the just and equitable ground for loss of substratum. The case also considered whether a public listed company can be subject to equitable considerations and constraints such as those which apply in the context of quasi-partnership cases.

The English High Court case Duneau v Klimt Invest SA & Ors [2022] EWHC 596 (Ch) is perhaps the first decision where a public listed company was wound up under section 122(1)(g) of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 on the just and equitable ground for loss of substratum. The case also considered whether a public listed company can be subject to equitable considerations and constraints such as those which apply in the context of quasi-partnership cases.

On 24 February, the Government published draft regulations that, if implemented, will impose new restrictions on pre-pack administration sales to connected parties. For all `substantial disposals' (which will include `pre-pack' sales) to connected parties, taking place within eight weeks of the administrators' appointment, the administrators will either need creditor consent or a report from an independent `evaluator'.

Context

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.

On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for