In a highly anticipated decision issued last Thursday (on December 19, 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC that a bankruptcy court may constitutionally confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization that contains nonconsensual third-party releases. The court considered whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits a bankruptcy court from granting such releases.

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling yesterday in the First Circuit case of Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, resolving a circuit split that had developed on “whether [a] debtor‑licensor’s rejection of an [executory trademark licensing agreement] deprives the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.” And it answered that question in the negative; i.e., in favor of licensees.

In a recent decision, In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 18-10518 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the mutuality requirement of section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed, declining to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.

During this mostly quiet week in restructuring, most of us are either away on vacation (think beach or ski) or home for the holidays, maybe back in our hometowns. For me, it’s always the latter, and home for the holidays is Virginia Beach, Virginia, where I sit while I write this blog post (alas, not the beach vacation some of you may be enjoying; my relatives live about 20 minutes from the beach and the high temperature this time of year is usually in the 40s).

In Judge Glenn’s recent lengthy decision recognizing and enforcing a restructuring plan in the chapter 15 proceedings of In re Agrokor1, a Croatian company in Croatian insolvency proceedings, he highlighted that the concept of comity – respect for rulings in other countries – remains an important U.S.

If you were to walk down Fifth Avenue and see a store displaying a white apple suspended in a large glass case, more likely than not you would immediately think of the California-based tech giant who shares its name with the nutritious snack. Similarly, if the person walking in front of you on your way to the Apple store lifted her heel to reveal a candy-apple red shoe sole, more likely than not the name Christian Louboutin would pop into your head.

In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit narrowly held that federal law does not prevent a bona fide shareholder from exercising its voting right in the company’s charter to prevent the filing by the company of a bankruptcy petition merely because it is also an unsecured creditor. In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 2018).

It’s been an interesting couple of weeks for bankruptcy at the United States Supreme Court with two bankruptcy-related decisions released in back-to-back weeks. Last week, the Supreme Court issued an important decision delineating the scope of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code (discussed here [1] for those who missed it).

Facts

A Trustee in Bankruptcy (‘TiB’) applied for committal of a bankrupt (‘B’) for contempt for repeated failure to provide financial information sought in conjunction with an application for an Income Payment Order (‘IPO’).

Facts

C’s appeal of his bankruptcy order failed. He then argued that pursuant to r 12.2(1) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 (‘IR 12.2’) as a matter of law the costs of the unsuccessful appeal should be treated as an expense of the bankruptcy estate; alternatively they were aprovable debt in the bankruptcy. D (the PC) contended that IR 7.51A gave the court an unfettered discretion as to the form of order and sought costs against C personally as a post-bankruptcy liability.