Introduction

On 30 April 2021, reforms to the UK’s regime governing sales in administration by way of a ‘pre-pack’ to a connected party purchaser came into force.

The centrepiece of the reforms is a new requirement for a connected party purchaser to obtain an opinion from an independent ‘evaluator’ on whether the terms of the sale are reasonable.

While the reforms add additional process points that must be navigated in relevant cases, they will bring improved transparency to an important rescue tool which has, at times, attracted warranted criticism.

Executive Summary

On March 15, 2021, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Third Circuit”) held that a stalking horse bidder may assert an administrative expense claim pursuant to section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code for costs incurred in attempting to close on an unsuccessful transaction, even when the stalking horse bidder is not entitled to a breakup or termination fee.

Background

Background

On 18 March 2021, the UK Government published its long-awaited white paper on restoring trust in audit and corporate governance.

This follows a series of high-profile audit errors and major corporate collapses, including those of BHS in 2016 and Carillion in 2018, which led the Government to commission three independent reviews into different aspects of the UK’s audit, reporting and corporate governance systems.

The white paper targets large listed and AIM-listed companies, and large private companies where there is a public interest, and primarily focuses on:

For most businesses, the Chancellor’s budget statement yesterday brings some welcome news with the extension of certain critical Covid-19 support measures. However, this is coupled with the removal of certain government-backed loan schemes and a future increase in the corporation tax rate from 19 per cent to 25 per cent from 2023 onwards.

Over the last 12 months, global markets have been amazingly resilient, indeed even buoyant, aided in large part by governments around Europe and the world providing seemingly unlimited funding and extensive financial stabilisation measures, such as quantitative easing.

This, coupled with protective legislation for companies to prevent insolvency filings and to ensure continued trading – for example, moratoriums, relaxations on insolvency filing obligations and restrictions on creditor actions – has given businesses significant breathing space and prevented widespread failures.

After Virgin Atlantic and Pizza Express achieved ‘too much consent’ and did not need cross-class cram down in the end, DeepOcean is the first judgment applying cross-class cram down as part of a restructuring plan.

While there has been much fuss over the recent ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Nine West LBO Securities Litigation¹ due to its potential ramifications for director liability, as we explored in Part I of our series on this case here, court watchers have paid less attention to the court’s treatment of officer liability and the interes