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Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In Re Brew Still Pty Ltd (admin apptd)[2023] NSWSC 256, Black J of the New South Wales Supreme Court declined an application for an adjournment of one month brought by the voluntary administrator appointed to Brew Still Pty Ltd three days prior to the hearing of the winding up application.

In the recent decision of Banerjee (Liquidator), in the matter of Eastside Formwork Pty Ltd (in liq) v Stojic [2022] FCA 1315, a liquidator succeeded in obtaining orders for a warrant to search for and seize books and records which had been concealed from the liquidator. The warrant was directed at the person deemed the ‘guiding mind and will’ of the company in liquidation, who had repeatedly ‘fobbed off’ requests for the production of all records of the company.

Key takeaways

In a recent decision handed down in Gold Valley Iron Pty Ltd (in liq) v OPS Screening & Crushing Equipment Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 134, Liquidators succeeded in establishing an ‘equipment lease with an option to purchase’ clause as being a security interest under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 which needed to be registered by the owner.

Key takeaways

What happens when a shady businessman transfers $1 million from one floundering car dealership to another via the bank account of an innocent immigrant? Will the first dealership’s future chapter 7 trustee be allowed to recover from the naïve newcomer as the “initial transferee” of a fraudulent transfer as per the strict letter of the law? Or will our brave courts of equity exercise their powers to prevent a most grave injustice?