Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.

In a recent decision, In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 18-10518 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the mutuality requirement of section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed, declining to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.

During this mostly quiet week in restructuring, most of us are either away on vacation (think beach or ski) or home for the holidays, maybe back in our hometowns. For me, it’s always the latter, and home for the holidays is Virginia Beach, Virginia, where I sit while I write this blog post (alas, not the beach vacation some of you may be enjoying; my relatives live about 20 minutes from the beach and the high temperature this time of year is usually in the 40s).

In Judge Glenn’s recent lengthy decision recognizing and enforcing a restructuring plan in the chapter 15 proceedings of In re Agrokor1, a Croatian company in Croatian insolvency proceedings, he highlighted that the concept of comity – respect for rulings in other countries – remains an important U.S.

If you were to walk down Fifth Avenue and see a store displaying a white apple suspended in a large glass case, more likely than not you would immediately think of the California-based tech giant who shares its name with the nutritious snack. Similarly, if the person walking in front of you on your way to the Apple store lifted her heel to reveal a candy-apple red shoe sole, more likely than not the name Christian Louboutin would pop into your head.

In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit narrowly held that federal law does not prevent a bona fide shareholder from exercising its voting right in the company’s charter to prevent the filing by the company of a bankruptcy petition merely because it is also an unsecured creditor. In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 2018).

It’s been an interesting couple of weeks for bankruptcy at the United States Supreme Court with two bankruptcy-related decisions released in back-to-back weeks. Last week, the Supreme Court issued an important decision delineating the scope of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code (discussed here [1] for those who missed it).

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.

Despite the initial glee of the prospect of a United States that was independent of Middle East oil, beginning in the fourth quarter of 2014, the price of oil started dropping precipitously.  As noted in a recent article, over 80 bankruptcies in the oil industry were filed in 2015, up 471 % over calendar year 2014.  

In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.¹ The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its