Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
For decades, restructuring and insolvency matters in the Dominican Republic involving merchants and companies in non-regulated industries have been carried out on a “de facto” basis, due to the obsolescence of the existing legal framework and institutions. Fortunately, that is not the case anymore.
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.
It is anticipated that, by the middle of the year, Australia will see the most significant reform to the corporate and personal insolvency environment in two decades. The reforms, which appear likely to be supported by all sides of government, are designed to promote business preservation and allow greater flexibility in order to ‘turnaround’ distressed companies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
In December 2015, as part of its National Innovation and Science Agenda, the Federal Government announced a proposal to introduce a ‘safe harbour’ for directors from personal liability for insolvent trading.
With continuing market volatility a number of companies remain under financial pressure. Businesses or individuals receiving payments from companies that might be financially distressed should be aware of the ability of a liquidator to apply to a court under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) to recover payments made to creditors in the six months prior to the appointment of a liquidator/administrator on the grounds the payment constituted an “unfair preference”.
Quick Recap on the Relevant Provisions
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background