“Reasonably equivalent value” – – part of the standard for evaluation of potential constructive fraudulent transfers – – is both subjective and imprecise. The words “equivalent value” require the court to make a subjective judgment whether consideration received in exchange for a transfer is worth the same as the consideration transferred by the debtor. And the considerations exchanged by the two parties are necessarily of differing characters. A transaction may involve the exchange of money for a tangible asset or for services.
In today's low interest rate environment, the difference between a contractual interest rate and the federal judgment rate can be quite significant. It is not surprising, therefore, that this issue has become hotly litigated in cases involving solvent Chapter 11 debtors. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Colfin Bulls Funding A v. Paloian (In re Dvorkin Holdings), 547 B.R. 880 (N.D. Ill.
Last week, our post “You Can’t Always Get What You Want” discussed a Texas bankruptcy court decision rejecting efforts by debtor Sam Wyly to claim as exempt a number of offshore private annuities.
The bankruptcy courts have a long history of being willing to use their judicial power under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent perceived efforts by debtors to inappropriately shield their assets from creditors. This is true even when the debtors employ structures and devices that are complex and crafted in seeming compliance with applicable law.
Puerto Rico is in the midst of a financial crisis. Over the past few years, its public debt skyrocketed while its government revenue sharply declined. In order to address its economic problems and to avoid mass public-worker layoffs and cuts in public services, the unincorporated U.S. territory issued billions of dollars in face value of municipal bonds. These bonds were readily saleable to investors in the United States due to their tax-exempt status and comparatively high yields.
It is relatively rare when a Circuit Court issues an opinion on the preference defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is even more unusual when a decision examines the fact-focused “ordinary course” defense under section 547(c)(2). The ordinary course defense shields payments determined to have been made in the “ordinary course of business” of both the debtor and the creditor.
Delaware has long established itself as a welcoming jurisdiction for various legal purposes. It began as a center for company incorporation by providing a corporate law framework that was flexible and continuously updated for new developments. More recently, Delaware has applied those same principles (plus an expansive view of venue) to become a center for major chapter 11 reorganization filings.
The courts have long struggled with the question of whether particular orders entered by a bankruptcy court are final, and therefore appealable as a matter of right. It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy case is distinctly different from the usual civil case in that it is a framework within which a variety of disputes arise and are resolved. That distinction is recognized in 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(1), which provides that appeals as of right maybe taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final judgments, orders, and decrees…in cases and proceedings….”
On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its opinion in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, Case No. 15-145.
Adding to the unsettled body of case law on the enforceability of prepetition waivers of the automatic stay, on April 27, 2016, the U.S.