The hair salon Regis announced recently that the company has entered administration. The news might not come as a surprise because the chain, prior to the company’s administration, was subject to a company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) whose validity was challenged by landlords.

The joint administrator of Regis commented: “trading challenges, coupled with the uncertainty caused by the legal challenge, have necessitated the need for an administration appointment”.

Can a CVA bind a landlord in respect of future rents? Is the landlord a creditor in respect of future rent? What about the right to forfeit; can a CVA modify that right? Is compromising rent under a CVA automatically unfair to landlords when other trade creditors are paid in full?

These were some of the points considered by the Court in determining whether the Debenhams’ CVA (which had been challenged by landlords) should fail.

One point of particular interest is whether reducing rents below market value in a CVA is automatically unfair to landlords?

On August 9, 2019, in a unanimous decision (written by a former bankruptcy judge), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the confirmation of the Peabody Energy Chapter 11 plan (“Plan”)¹ with a prominent backstopped rights offering component.

There has been an influx of company voluntary arrangements (“CVAs”) in recent times, as retailers fight to rescue their UK high street stores. Retail CVAs accounts for the highest proportion of CVAs at 19%. As more and more CVAs are approved, we consider some of the recent trends seen in the retail sector which showcase the flexibility of a CVA and reflect the demands of landlords whose support is vital to the continuing viability of a business.

What is a CVA?

In Mission Product Holdings, the Supreme Court Endorses “Rejection-as-Breach” Rule and Interprets Broadly the Contract Rights that Survive Rejection

Last year, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Merit, unanimously ruling that a buyout transaction between private parties did not qualify for “safe harbor” protection under Bankruptcy Code section 546(e), on the basis that a “financial institution” acted as an intermediary in the overarching transaction.

The proposal to reinstate Crown preference in insolvency has met resistance from all angles; the insolvency profession, turnaround experts, accountants, lawyers and funders. But despite HMRC’s bold statement in its consultation paper that the re-introduction of Crown preference will have little impact on funders, it is clear following a discussion with lenders that it may well have a far wider impact on existing and new business, business rescue and the economy in general than HMRC believes.

With the gradual opening of energy supply markets allowing new energy providers to challenge the established providers and bring increased competition to the market, the last two decades have seen an increase in smaller energy providers entering the market and sharing a growing customer base. But what happens to the customers when an energy provider becomes insolvent?

On March 18, 2019, Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision enforcing a mortgage lender’s claim for a prepayment premium (a/k/a make-whole or yield maintenance premium) notwithstanding the lender’s prepetition acceleration of the loan due to the debtor’s default.

The case of Davey v Money and Anor (2018) EWHC 766 (Ch) should serve as a gentle warning to secured creditors to be aware of the level of their involvement in the administration of a customer.

Background

Angel House Development Limited (“AHDL“), a property development company, borrowed £16 million from Dunbar Assets Plc (“Dunbar“) in order to fund the purchase and redevelopment of a property, Angel House, in Tower Hamlets. Dunbar took security for the loan(s) in the form of a debenture.