Snapshot

The Restructuring Plan (Plan) was introduced as part of the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which introduced a new part 26A into the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The part 26A Plan provisions are largely based on the existing scheme of arrangement rules detailed under part 26 of the CA 2006, and it is often referred to as the “super scheme”.

Plans now sit alongside schemes of arrangement and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) to provide a further restructuring option for companies and insolvency practitioners alike.

What can we say about the outcome of the GAS (Great Annual Savings Company Limited) sanction hearing that hasn’t already been reported?

It’s impossible not to comment on the fact that the plan was not sanctioned, and as a consequence of fierce opposition from HMRC that it avoided cram down. Nor that the court refused to sanction the plan on the basis that the conditions for cram down were not met – the court was not satisfied that HMRC would be better off under the plan and even if it were the judge said he would have not exercised his discretion to cram down.

‘If, at first, you don’t succeed, then try and try again’ is a fitting description for HMRC’s recent approach to restructuring plans, with its opposition of plans proposed by The Great Annual Savings Company (GAS) and Nasmyth Group Limited (Naysmyth).

The GAS sanction hearing (which is due to take place this week) will be the first time that HMRC has taken an active role contesting a restructuring plan at sanction following the case of Houst where the Court exercised its discretionary power to “cram down” HMRC.

In a previous blog about the case of Mizen we considered the case from the point of view of “guarantee stripping”, looking at how the CVA dealt with those claims. However, the CVA was challenged on a number of bases, including whether it was unfairly prejudicial as a consequence of “vote swamping”.

In this blog, we look at that aspect of the case.

A company voluntary arrangement (CVA) is a tool which has been widely utilised by companies seeking to restructure and compromise liabilities.

In recent years CVAs have been in the limelight because of attacks by landlords who feel that they have been unfairly prejudiced by the CVA terms. Largely, challenges such as those to the Regis and New Look CVAs have been unsuccessful, but arguments about unfair prejudice based on “vote swamping” were left open for future debate.

Where a commercial property is sold by a receiver or insolvency practitioner (IP), VAT must be charged on the sale if the owner had exercised and properly notified an option to tax (OTT) in respect of the property. The IP acting on behalf of the seller needs to establish whether an OTT has been made and notified so that VAT is charged , if needed.  This can be difficult if company records are in disarray, directors of the insolvent company are non-cooperative and/or the IP or receiver has limited knowledge of the property and company.

Following the sanctioning of the Good Box restructuring plan (RP) it seems the answer is yes. This might sound surprising to those familiar with schemes of arrangement, because that outcome is at odds with the long-standing decision in Re Savoy Hotels.

For those less familiar with schemes and scheme case law, the court declined to sanction the Savoy scheme because the company did not approve it, consequently the judge found that the court had no jurisdiction to sanction it.

It is difficult to predict what 2023 might hold for businesses in the UK. Given the difficult economic environment, many will already be facing a challenging start to the year. Although the challenges of the pandemic (such as lock downs) have gone, others have materialised. Energy price hikes and inflation rises continue to make trading conditions tough.

Can a Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”) complete, but still remain in place and bind creditors?

The simple answer is yes; but it does require (a) the terms of the CVA to be carefully drafted to allow notice of completion to be filed before the end of the CVA term; (b) compliance with the terms of the CVA, and (c) careful consideration of the position of the supervisors, creditors and company.

“以房抵债”安排，原常见于缓解开发商在开发过程中少量资金短缺的问题，但部分房地产企业逐渐将其演化作为平衡资金需求的工具，签订大量的“以房抵债”协议，在出现现金流危机、甚至濒临破产的情况下，无力偿还欠款，也无力建完房屋交付债权人，使得“以房抵债”的实现问题变得愈加尖锐。而在理论和实践中，“以房抵债”也存在较多的争议，即便表面上均具备相似的特征，由于个案事实细微的差别，或是裁判观点不同，导致不同的判决结果。故此，本文拟就“以房抵债”在破产程序中可能面临的不同效果进行梳理及探讨。

一、关于“以房抵债”的法律关系的厘清

实践中关于“以房抵债”存在着各种各样的约定，归纳起来，最为常见的为“以物抵债”类型的安排：通常发生在债务到期后（部分案件中可能发生在债务到期前），即以债务人或他人持有的房屋作为抵偿债务的“物”，通过折价转让给债权人的形式，实现债务清偿的目的。该种抵偿改变了原债权金钱给付的方式，在理论上，可称为“他种给付型以房抵债”。