Restructuring Plans (RPs)
2024 was a year of firsts for RPs, and as case law in this area continues to evolve, there is little doubt that this will carry through into 2025.
It would be remiss not to expect to see more RPs in 2025. News of Thames Water's restructuring is "splashed" all over the press and Speciality Steel's plan might see the first "cram up" of creditors, but there seems a long way to go to get creditors onside.
To prevent landlords under long-term real property leases from reaping a windfall for future rent claims at the expense of other creditors, the Bankruptcy Code caps the amount of a landlord's claim against a debtor-tenant for damages "resulting from the termination" of a real property lease.
Categorisation of a charge as fixed or floating will have a significant impact on how assets are dealt with on insolvency and creditor outcomes.
Typical fixed charge assets include land, property, shares, plant and machinery, intellectual property such as copyrights, patents and trademarks and goodwill.
Typical floating charge assets include stock and inventory, trade debtors, cash and currency, movable plant and machinery (such as vehicles), and raw materials and other consumable items used by the business.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the scope of the provision, including its limitation to transactions involving "financial institutions" as transferors or transferees, its preemption of avoidance litigation that could have been commenced by or on behalf of creditors under applicable non-bankruptcy law, and its application to non-public transactions.
As practitioners we pour over notices of intention to appoint (NOIA) and notices of appointment of administrators (NOA) to make sure every detail is accurate. Why? Because no one wants to risk an invalid appointment because there was a minor mistake or error that was overlooked. Understandably errors occur, particularly when the appointment of administrators often happens at speed, with all parties inevitably juggling many balls. Prescribed information may have been missed, or incorrectly stated and procedural steps may have been inadvertently forgotten.
For those that are that way inclined (which includes us at #SPBRestructuring!), the 500 plus page Wright v Chappell judgment which sets out the BHS wrongful trading claim against its former directors makes for an interesting read. It paints a colourful picture of the downfall of the BHS group, from the point that it was sold for £1 to its eventual demise into administration and then liquidation. You can make your own mind up about the characters involved, but the story is a sorry one, with creditors ultimately suffering the most.
No, it isn’t. We now have two cases where the Court has confirmed that insolvency practitioners do not need the consent of paid secured creditors when extending an administration under para. 78 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”).
This question was considered in the recent case of Pindar where the judge concluded that an administration had been validly extended where the consent of one of the secured creditors (who had been paid) was not obtained.
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA has issued a consultation about proposed changes to its Guidance for Insolvency Practitioners. The aim is to clarify existing guidance and provide more information to insolvency practitioners (IPs) on how to deal with regulated firms.
One of the fundamental goals of a chapter 11 bankruptcy is the maximization of value available for distribution to creditors. The "absolute priority rule" generally applicable in chapter 11 requires that each class of impaired and unaccepting creditors be paid in full before any junior class of claims or interests may receive distributions under the plan. Courts recognize a limited exception to the absolute priority rule, however, allowing prepetition shareholders to retain their interest in the debtor where they contribute new value toward the debtor's reorganization.