Snapshot

The Restructuring Plan (Plan) was introduced as part of the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which introduced a new part 26A into the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The part 26A Plan provisions are largely based on the existing scheme of arrangement rules detailed under part 26 of the CA 2006, and it is often referred to as the “super scheme”.

Plans now sit alongside schemes of arrangement and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) to provide a further restructuring option for companies and insolvency practitioners alike.

What can we say about the outcome of the GAS (Great Annual Savings Company Limited) sanction hearing that hasn’t already been reported?

It’s impossible not to comment on the fact that the plan was not sanctioned, and as a consequence of fierce opposition from HMRC that it avoided cram down. Nor that the court refused to sanction the plan on the basis that the conditions for cram down were not met – the court was not satisfied that HMRC would be better off under the plan and even if it were the judge said he would have not exercised his discretion to cram down.

‘If, at first, you don’t succeed, then try and try again’ is a fitting description for HMRC’s recent approach to restructuring plans, with its opposition of plans proposed by The Great Annual Savings Company (GAS) and Nasmyth Group Limited (Naysmyth).

The GAS sanction hearing (which is due to take place this week) will be the first time that HMRC has taken an active role contesting a restructuring plan at sanction following the case of Houst where the Court exercised its discretionary power to “cram down” HMRC.

In a previous blog about the case of Mizen we considered the case from the point of view of “guarantee stripping”, looking at how the CVA dealt with those claims. However, the CVA was challenged on a number of bases, including whether it was unfairly prejudicial as a consequence of “vote swamping”.

In this blog, we look at that aspect of the case.

A company voluntary arrangement (CVA) is a tool which has been widely utilised by companies seeking to restructure and compromise liabilities.

In recent years CVAs have been in the limelight because of attacks by landlords who feel that they have been unfairly prejudiced by the CVA terms. Largely, challenges such as those to the Regis and New Look CVAs have been unsuccessful, but arguments about unfair prejudice based on “vote swamping” were left open for future debate.

Where a commercial property is sold by a receiver or insolvency practitioner (IP), VAT must be charged on the sale if the owner had exercised and properly notified an option to tax (OTT) in respect of the property. The IP acting on behalf of the seller needs to establish whether an OTT has been made and notified so that VAT is charged , if needed.  This can be difficult if company records are in disarray, directors of the insolvent company are non-cooperative and/or the IP or receiver has limited knowledge of the property and company.

Following the sanctioning of the Good Box restructuring plan (RP) it seems the answer is yes. This might sound surprising to those familiar with schemes of arrangement, because that outcome is at odds with the long-standing decision in Re Savoy Hotels.

For those less familiar with schemes and scheme case law, the court declined to sanction the Savoy scheme because the company did not approve it, consequently the judge found that the court had no jurisdiction to sanction it.

It is difficult to predict what 2023 might hold for businesses in the UK. Given the difficult economic environment, many will already be facing a challenging start to the year. Although the challenges of the pandemic (such as lock downs) have gone, others have materialised. Energy price hikes and inflation rises continue to make trading conditions tough.

中伦观点

在系列上篇中，我们梳理了地产项目债务重组相关政策，结合经验总结债务重组的原则、项目与项目公司尽职调查实务重点。在下篇中，我们着重梳理困境项目重组方案经验，并分享对行政赋能的一些思考，供读者参考。

房地产行业高速发展10余年，在“房住不炒”的宏观背景以及2020年8月“三道红线”政策后，因房地产行业的发展模式及市场发展规律、政策执行力度、国家宏观调控等多方面的原因，房地产市场从2021年9月开始经历行业“缩表”的阵痛，不少大型房地产企业先后出现债务风险，面临诸多的困难处境，继而影响资金方、施工方、材料设备供应方及购房业主等多方主体。房地产市场影响国民经济及民生多个方面，在行业困境下，政府亦在监管、维稳、施救等多方面遇到难题。表面上看，各方主体皆可按政策与法律处理，但实操中，商业诉求与法律的平衡，经济效果与社会效果、法律效果的协调，社会资源的调度与节约，仍需探索最佳路径。

本文仅就困境项目的成因、市场常见盘活方案等问题，从法律角度予以整理，请勿以此作为法律意见在实践中套用。

一、困境项目重组方案

房地产行业高速发展10余年，在“房住不炒”的宏观背景以及2020年8月“三道红线”政策后，因房地产行业的发展模式及市场发展规律、政策执行力度、国家宏观调控等多方面的原因，房地产市场从2021年9月开始经历行业“缩表”的阵痛，不少大型房地产企业先后出现债务风险，面临诸多的困难处境，继而影响资金方、施工方、材料设备供应方及购房业主等多方主体。房地产市场影响国民经济及民生多个方面，在行业困境下，政府亦在监管、维稳、施救等多方面遇到难题。表面上看，各方主体皆可按政策与法律处理，但实操中，商业诉求与法律的平衡，经济效果与社会效果、法律效果的协调，社会资源的调度与节约，仍需探索最佳路径。

单纯的法律手段难以解决问题的情形下，笔者认为：房地产困境的解决，最终需要落实到具体的房地产项目庭外重组与盘活。开展全行业性的政策拯救或对大型地产公司进行全面的庭外重组盘活，需假以时日并多方共同努力。因此，结合近一年多的地产项目重组盘活经验，笔者希望从政府管理、商业诉求、法律实践等方面，为各方在房地产项目困境中破局提供些建议，达到解决具体房地产项目的实际问题，使项目价值最大化，最大程度实现各方利益诉求，从一定程度上缓解目前房地产困境。

本文仅就困境项目的成因、市场常见盘活方案等问题，从法律角度予以整理，请勿以此作为法律意见在实践中套用。