本文结合了笔者承办的2023年度“全国破产经典案例”哈尔滨工大高新技术产业开发股份有限公司等五家公司破产重整案和近年来约50家退市公司重整的理论分析和实践经验，探讨退市公司独有的重整价值、重整路径及实务中的常见争议疑难问题，现采撷文章要点，抛砖引玉供各界同仁研究探讨。

一、引言

2024年4月，国务院出台《关于加强监管防范风险推动资本市场高质量发展的若干意见》，中国证券监督管理委员会出台《关于严格执行退市制度的意见》，证券交易所修订《上海证券交易所股票上市规则》《深圳证券交易所股票上市规则》等业务规则（以下合称“国九条及相关配套文件”）。“国九条及相关配套文件”旨在加强对市场的监管，倡导退市常态化。在2019年以前，每年退市数量几乎都在个位数；自2019年开始，上市公司退市逐渐进入加速状态，2020年退市数量达到20家，2021年退市数量达到23家，2022年退市数量达到50家，2023年退市数量达到46家，2024年度截至9月6日已经退市49家企业。上市公司退市后的出路作为整体性退市制度设计的一环，退市公司破产重整逐渐引发学界和市场的关注。

One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.

How does it happen?

As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.

When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.