近年来，预重整已成为上市公司进入司法重整前几乎不可或缺的前置环节，其源于本土需求、服务于纾困实践的兴起路径，彰显了市场对高效挽救机制的迫切期待。然而，在立法规则尚属空白、实践探索快速扩张的背景下，该制度正面临深刻的异化趋势：预重整作为解决重整效率瓶颈与确定性风险而诞生的“辅助工具”，当其价值被证明有效后，迅速从“可选项”变成“默认项”，几乎成为上市公司重整的必经之路，其功能从“预先协商桥梁”偏移为“实质工作前置”，进而引致临时管理人角色模糊、权责失衡、企业拯救成本攀升等一系列结构性困境。基于对这一市场趋势的密切关注与忧思，本文聚焦于制度逻辑的完整性、各方权责利的平衡性以及程序正义的可实现性，将依次追溯制度的生成逻辑，呈现规则图谱的留白现状，解剖功能偏移衍生的核心痛点，并最终尝试提出使预重整回归其商业谈判本质、约束于重整前协商程序的路径展望。笔者深信，唯有正视当前实践中的张力与悖论，方能推动这一重要企业风险纾困工具的行稳致远，真正实现其提升困境企业重生效率与公平的初心。
一、制度起源：中国本土语境下的生成逻辑与“生存突围”
前言
2024年8月26日，苏州市检察院发布了《破产检察监督案件审查指引》（以下简称“《指引》”）。《指引》共计四章六十八条，全面涵盖破产检察监督的基本原则、监督范围、审查要素、监督方式和工作保障等内容。一定程度上，这是全国首例由检察机关根据破产程序的不同环节，详细完善地单独出台破产检察监督相关规定。9月30日，江苏省检察院召开破产领域检察监督工作新闻发布会，通报了全省检察机关开展破产领域检察监督工作的整体情况。
在《指引》出台前，检察机关对破产程序进行检察监督的法律规定较为原则化，缺乏实操层面的系统性规范。近年随着破产重整等案件数量的大幅增加，破产法律制度因缺乏直接、高效的违法行为监督与纠偏机制，导致债权人等破产参与主体的救济机制略显单一，在经济发展和立法实践中呈现出局限性。在各界呼吁拓展外部监督机制的背景下，各地检察机关不断深化提升破产检察监督职能。在本次《指引》发布前，江苏省检察院在2020年即已出台《加强破产案件检察监督工作的指导意见（试行）》，尝试更为规范地对破产程序进行检察监督。通过4年时间的摸索、总结与完善，江苏省检察机关共办理涉破产监督案件1,351件，为本次《指引》的出台奠定了理论与实践基础。
One difficulty encountered by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy is the use of one or more aliases by a bankrupt. Whether it is an innocent use of a nickname or an attempt to conceal one's identity, the use of an alias can often create problems for creditors seeking to pursue debts and for trustees seeking to recover assets held by a bankrupt.
How does it happen?
As concerns about illegal phoenix activity continue to mount, it is worth remembering that the Corporations Act gives liquidators and provisional liquidators a powerful remedy to search and seize property or books of the company if it appears to the Court that the conduct of the liquidation is being prevented or delayed.
When a person is declared a bankrupt, certain liberties are taken away from that person. One restriction includes a prohibition against travelling overseas unless the approval has been given by the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was recently considered by the Federal Court in Moltoni v Macks as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Moltoni (No 2) [2020] FCA 792, which involved the Federal Court's review of the trustee's initial refusal of an application by a bankrupt, Mr Moltoni, to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.
What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?
In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?
Getting to the top
The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.
Background
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?