Editorial | Restructuring Directive  

Editorial | CEE

In the previous four articles in this series (see here) we looked at the key role of professional investors at startups, though also at the setbacks of the exclusive dependence of these types of companies on equity and the advantages debt would have for them. The environment, as we saw, is also a favorable one for borrowing. We described the difficulty to provide general recipes for getting debt and a few not very promising routes.

En los cuatro artículos anteriores de esta serie (ver aquí) analizamos el papel clave de los inversores profesionales en las 'startups', pero también las desventajas de la exclusiva dependencia de este tipo de empresas del 'equity' y las ventajas que tendría la deuda para ellas. El entorno, como vimos, es además favorable para el endeudamiento. Abordamos la dificultad de ofrecer recetas generales para conseguir deuda y algunas vías no muy prometedoras.

Reasoning behind the changes

In the two years that the "new" bankruptcy regime – the Bankruptcy Act of September 2015 (Stečajni zakon; the "BA") – has been in place, the number of pre-bankruptcy procedures initiated in Croatia has plummeted to only 273, with 58 restructuring plans being accepted. By comparison, under the previous pre-bankruptcy regime from 2012 to 2015, 8,262 pre-bankruptcy procedures were initiated, with 2,224 restructuring plans being reached.

The recently adopted Croatian Bankruptcy Act ("SZ")[1] sets out a new integrated pre-bankruptcy and bankruptcy regime. SZ has entirely replaced the previous bankruptcy act that was in force for 18 years, as well as provisions regulating pre-bankruptcy settlement proceedings prescribed under the Act on Financial Operations and Pre-bankruptcy Settlement