近年来，预重整已成为上市公司进入司法重整前几乎不可或缺的前置环节，其源于本土需求、服务于纾困实践的兴起路径，彰显了市场对高效挽救机制的迫切期待。然而，在立法规则尚属空白、实践探索快速扩张的背景下，该制度正面临深刻的异化趋势：预重整作为解决重整效率瓶颈与确定性风险而诞生的“辅助工具”，当其价值被证明有效后，迅速从“可选项”变成“默认项”，几乎成为上市公司重整的必经之路，其功能从“预先协商桥梁”偏移为“实质工作前置”，进而引致临时管理人角色模糊、权责失衡、企业拯救成本攀升等一系列结构性困境。基于对这一市场趋势的密切关注与忧思，本文聚焦于制度逻辑的完整性、各方权责利的平衡性以及程序正义的可实现性，将依次追溯制度的生成逻辑，呈现规则图谱的留白现状，解剖功能偏移衍生的核心痛点，并最终尝试提出使预重整回归其商业谈判本质、约束于重整前协商程序的路径展望。笔者深信，唯有正视当前实践中的张力与悖论，方能推动这一重要企业风险纾困工具的行稳致远，真正实现其提升困境企业重生效率与公平的初心。

一、制度起源：中国本土语境下的生成逻辑与“生存突围”

Can section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986 serve as a fast-track route for administrators to secure vacant possession of property from trespassers? That was the question before the High Court in the recent case of Maher v Investalet Ltd [2025] EWHC 3133 (Ch).

The facts

It’s hard to write a pithy article about the transfer of proceedings from the High Court in London to the Central London County Court (CLCC), but given its wide-reaching implications I thought it was worth a try.

The High Court has approved a £3bn rescue package for Thames Water to plug the leak in the water company's finances while it seeks to secure a wider restructuring deal. This is stage one in Thames Water's plan to restructure its £19bn debt mountain and secure £5bn in equity investment, with the initial cash injection urgently required to service £200m of debt which falls due on 24 March.

In a recent ruling (NMC Health PLC (in Administration) v Ernst & Young LLP [2024] EWHC 2905 (Comm)), the High Court declined to order disclosure of witness statements and transcripts of interviews conducted by administrators during their initial investigations, citing litigation privilege.

Litigation privilege

前言

2024年8月26日，苏州市检察院发布了《破产检察监督案件审查指引》（以下简称“《指引》”）。《指引》共计四章六十八条，全面涵盖破产检察监督的基本原则、监督范围、审查要素、监督方式和工作保障等内容。一定程度上，这是全国首例由检察机关根据破产程序的不同环节，详细完善地单独出台破产检察监督相关规定。9月30日，江苏省检察院召开破产领域检察监督工作新闻发布会，通报了全省检察机关开展破产领域检察监督工作的整体情况。

在《指引》出台前，检察机关对破产程序进行检察监督的法律规定较为原则化，缺乏实操层面的系统性规范。近年随着破产重整等案件数量的大幅增加，破产法律制度因缺乏直接、高效的违法行为监督与纠偏机制，导致债权人等破产参与主体的救济机制略显单一，在经济发展和立法实践中呈现出局限性。在各界呼吁拓展外部监督机制的背景下，各地检察机关不断深化提升破产检察监督职能。在本次《指引》发布前，江苏省检察院在2020年即已出台《加强破产案件检察监督工作的指导意见（试行）》，尝试更为规范地对破产程序进行检察监督。通过4年时间的摸索、总结与完善，江苏省检察机关共办理涉破产监督案件1,351件，为本次《指引》的出台奠定了理论与实践基础。

How to keep your head above water in the face of economic uncertainty, as told by Lucy Trott, Senior Associate, Stevens & Bolton.

Businesses in turmoil dominate the financial press. That depiction of financial distress is supported by monthly figures which make plain that the financial legacy of the Covid-19 pandemic is an increasing number of insolvencies. It is a trend which does not show any sign of abating.

What happens to a company at the end of an administration is a question that probably only keeps insolvency anoraks up at night.

There are a limited number of potential options, with the rescue of the company as a going concern being the number one objective to which all administrators aspire. However, more often than not, an administration will end with the company entering liquidation or, where the company has no property to permit a distribution to creditors, the dissolution of the company.

Boris Becker was originally made bankrupt in June 2017. In the ordinary course, a debtor is made bankrupt for a period of one year, and upon the anniversary of the bankruptcy order they are automatically discharged. While a bankrupt is undischarged, they are subject to various restrictions e.g. they are unable to act as company director or be involved in the management, promotion or formation of a business. Once discharged, the debtor can (in theory) start to rebuild their life afresh while their pre-bankruptcy assets remain in the hands of their trustee in bankruptcy (the Trustee).

In the recent case of Loveridge v Povey and Ors [2024] EWHC 329 (Ch) a company shareholder sought to challenge the administrators’ decision to rescue a balance sheet solvent company as a going concern by securing additional funding, as opposed to pursuing a sale of the business.

Background