Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.
On January 31, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC1 declined to designate the votes of parties to a post-petition restructuring support agreement (i.e., a lock-up agreement), instead confirming the Debtors’ Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) based on the votes of such parties.
Debt for Equity Exchanges Outside Bankruptcy
The recession has highlighted a new risk for borrowers – the risk that a lender will be insolvent and default on its obligation to fund loans under the credit agreement. This has created unexpected issues under credit agreements, which were written at a time when lender insolvency was not a perceived risk.”34