The majority of the building and engineering contracts that we encounter (and draft) require some form of performance security from the contractor, whether this is a parent company performance guarantee granted by the contractor's ultimate holding company, or a performance bond granted by a third party surety or a bank for a capped sum. Indeed most, if not all, standard form contracts provide for these forms of security, even if only as an option.

In standard building contracts most commonly used in the UK, a party is entitled to terminate the contract if the other party is insolvent (Clause 91 of NEC3 and NEC4 and Clause 8.5 and 8.10 of JCT/SBCC).

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 provides measures for businesses that are designed to provide temporary reliefs during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as permanent measures for companies in financial difficulty.

Insolvency in the construction industry is not just isolated to contractors, sub-contractors and consultants. Industry and economic pressures can affect all parties, including at times employers, therefore it is equally important for contractors to carry out due diligence when bidding for projects and to consider contractual mechanisms that can be put in place to protect against non-payment by the employer and insolvency risks.

One of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a debtor with a fresh start. The discharge of prepetition debts at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case is one of the most important ways to attain this fresh start.  On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court made it harder for debtors to obtain a fresh start by broadening an exception to discharge.

Since May, we’ve followed Solus v. Perry, a New York County Supreme Court case originally filed in July of 2012. The case centered around whether Perry entered into a binding oral agreement to sell Solus a participation interest in a $1.6 billion claim against Bernie Madoff’s bankruptcy estate.

Personal data is a valuable corporate asset.  At times, the personal information collected from customers (such as email address, mailing address, phone number, etc.) can be a company’s most valuable asset.  Unfortunately, when a company attempts to sell this asset, it can find the value of the data significantly diminished due to promises made in a privacy policy the company implemented years before it ever contemplated such a sale.

The bankruptcy case of TOUSA, Inc. and its various subsidiaries (collectively “Tousa”) is one where lenders have seen their fortunes rise and fall. On March 15, 2012, they fell again when the Eleventh Circuit¹ (the “Circuit Court”) reversed the District Court’s opinion and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court’s order, which had disgorged over $400 million from Tousa’s senior lenders and avoided certain guarantees and liens granted to them by the Conveying Subsidiaries (defined below).