The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

In In re Linn Energy, LLC, 2019 WL 4149481 (5th Cir. Sept. 3, 2019), the Fifth Circuit recently reminded us that if a debt instrument looks like a security and quacks like a security, it likely is a security for purposes of subordination under section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The implications of characterizing an instrument as a security under section 510(b) is that any claim arising therefrom is subject to subordination to general unsecured creditors.

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

A debtor has the right to assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease through its bankruptcy, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. A trademark license is an executory contract that is subject to assumption or rejection if performance remains due from both parties to the contract. A debtor will reject a trademark license if it believes that there is no net benefit to the counterparty to the contract continuing to perform its obligations and thereby will repudiate any further performance of its obligations.

A debtor has the right to assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease through its bankruptcy, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.  A trademark license is an executory contract that is subject to assumption or rejection if performance remains due from both parties to the contract.

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.

In Popular Auto, Inc. v. Reyes-Colon (In re Reyes-Colon), Nos. 17-1971, 17-1972, 2019 WL 1785039 (1st Cir. April 24, 2019), the First Circuit recently ruled that “special circumstances” does not authorize a bankruptcy court to use its equitable powers to contravene the numerosity requirement for an involuntary petition under section 303(b)(1) of the Code. This twelve year dispute did not end well for the petitioning creditors.

Addressing unknown future claims in a chapter 11 bankruptcy involves two competing concerns: (a) providing a debtor with a fresh start and (b) providing an unwitting claimant with due process. These competing concerns clash when a debtor seeks to confirm its plan of reorganization, which is intended to provide remedies to all the debtor’s creditors and provide the debtor with a discharge of all pre-confirmation liabilities.

In Keystone Gas Gathering, L.L.C.v. Ad Hoc Committee of Unsecured Creditorsof Ultra Resources, Incorporated (In re Ultra Petroleum Corporation), Case No. 17-20793, –F.3d–, 2019 WL 237365 (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 2019) (Oldham, J.), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a class of creditors is not “impaired” by a reorganization plan simply because it (a) incorporates the Bankruptcy Code’s restrictions on payment of unmatured interest and (b) fails to award unsecured creditors interest at the contractual rate.