Executive Summary

Context

As we described in our client alert dated September 14, 2016, in the aftermath of the real estate downturn from 1989 to 1993, when real estate mortgage lenders began to contemplate making new mortgage loans, they sought to create new legal structures to prevent their prospective borrowers from filing for Chapter 11, and to ameliorate the adverse consequences, if such a filing were to occur.

In our client alert dated September 14, 2016, we discussed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, which refused to invalidate a bankruptcy filing made without the consent of its lender who held a “Golden Share” as void against federal public policy.

I. Introduction

On November 28, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit published an opinion affirming the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the Mexican Plan of Reorganization (the “Concurso Plan”) of the Mexican glass-manufacturing company, Vitro, S.A.B.

On June 13, 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”) published an opinion ruling on whether the Mexican Plan of Reorganization (the “Concurso Plan”) of the Mexican glass-manufacturing company, Vitro, S.A.B.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.

Companies that engage in multiple transactions with different entities of related groups often enter into contractual netting agreements that allow the setoff of obligations between entities within the groups. The effectiveness of these agreements has been called into question by a recent decision of a bankruptcy court in Delaware, which refused to allow a party to a contractual netting agreement to offset its obligations to the debtors against obligations of the debtors under the netting agreement.