Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.
On January 31, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC1 declined to designate the votes of parties to a post-petition restructuring support agreement (i.e., a lock-up agreement), instead confirming the Debtors’ Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) based on the votes of such parties.
On November 28, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit published an opinion affirming the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the Mexican Plan of Reorganization (the “Concurso Plan”) of the Mexican glass-manufacturing company, Vitro, S.A.B.
On June 13, 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”) published an opinion ruling on whether the Mexican Plan of Reorganization (the “Concurso Plan”) of the Mexican glass-manufacturing company, Vitro, S.A.B.
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.
Companies that engage in multiple transactions with different entities of related groups often enter into contractual netting agreements that allow the setoff of obligations between entities within the groups. The effectiveness of these agreements has been called into question by a recent decision of a bankruptcy court in Delaware, which refused to allow a party to a contractual netting agreement to offset its obligations to the debtors against obligations of the debtors under the netting agreement.