In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.
On October 8, 2010, the FDIC approved a Proposed Rule that would implement certain provisions of its authority granted by Congress in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Title II”) to act as receiver for covered financial companies (failing financial companies that pose significant risks to the financial stability of the United States) when a Bankruptcy Code proceeding is found to be inappropriate. Prior to the enactment of the Dodd‑Frank Act on July 21, 2010, no unified statutory scheme for the orderly liquidation of covered financial companies existed.
The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.
On October 21, 2010, the Ninth Circuit overruled what many thought to be well-settled law, and held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have standing to pursue alter ego claims, at least in cases governed by California law. The court first held that California state law does not recognize a general alter-ego cause of action that allows an entity and its equity holders to be treated as alter egos for purposes of all of the entity’s debts.
The FDIC has published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing rules for the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions providing that the FDIC may, as a receiver, “resolve” (i.e., liquidate) covered financial companies.
The appointment of a receiver is one of the oldest equitable remedies. A receiver can receive, preserve, and manage property and funds, and even take charge of an operating business, as directed by the court. Appointing a receiver is a powerful remedy, not undertaken lightly by the courts.
In a much-followed case given the recent publicity surrounding collapsed Ponzi schemes, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 17, 2010 reversed a decision of the Bankruptcy Court from the Southern District of New York that had broadened the scope of those facts and circumstances that may trigger inquiry notice under the "good faith" defense to a fraudulent conveyance claim. In re Bayou Group, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99590 (S.D.N.Y. September 17, 2010).
Most polls, political pundits, and crystal balls are predicting a larger crowd on the Republican side of the aisle after the midterm elections, potentially giving them a majority in the House and tightening the margin in the Senate. The natural question that follows is what will happen to Dodd-Frank if the composition of Congress changes significantly? Is it possible that with a Republican majority the House may seek to repeal one of the most controversial pieces of legislation enacted by the Obama administration?
On October 28, 2010, Banning Lewis Ranch Co. LLC and Banning Lewis Ranch Development I & II, LLC (collectively, "Banning"), filed chapter 11 petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. A copy of one of the Banning bankruptcy petition is available here for review. Banning owns over 21,000 acres of land situated on the east side of Colorado Springs, Colorado.