When debt restructuring discussions are at an impasse and the reservoir of goodwill between the parties has run dry, stakeholders face difficult choices. For a lender, one of the most powerful tools available is the exercise of rights under a voting proxy given by a parent holding company in connection with a pledge of a borrower’s stock or membership interests. Through the exercise of proxy rights, lenders may replace a borrower’s board of directors with a new board made up of independent directors.

In April, we discussed how Colorado’s state supreme court issued its highly anticipated decision confirming a borrower’s bankruptcy discharge does not accelerate secured installment debt or trigger the final statute of limitations period to recover the debt.

In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

In May I wrote about a manufacturer of Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) excused from the PFAS Multi-District Litigation in South Carolina because its PFAS-related liabilities might exceed its assets which is something for a Federal Bankruptcy Court to sort out.  At the time I worried that this was only one of many PFAS-related bankruptcies we would be seeing

A bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid and recover pre-bankruptcy preferential transfers is essential to preserving or augmenting the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. In 2019, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to add a due diligence requirement to the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provision, apparently as a way to minimize the volume of speculative and coercive preference litigation.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.

Until recently, the nature of ownership of assets on deposit with a third party was not controversial. If a local bank branch goes bankrupt, the cash or other assets deposited with the bank belonged to individual depositors/customers, safely out of the reach of the bank’s creditors, reinforced by numerous federal and state regulations, and bankruptcy case law.

But what happens if the asset that’s been deposited is cryptocurrency, held by a third-party, non-bank custodian?

In In re Golden Sphinx Ltd., 2023 WL 2823391 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California denied a motion filed by a creditor of a chapter 15 debtor seeking discovery from a bank that had provided financing to one of the debtor's affiliates.

There is longstanding controversy concerning the validity of third-party release provisions in non-asbestos trust chapter 11 plans that limit the potential exposure of various non-debtor parties involved in the process of negotiating, implementing and funding a plan. In the latest chapter of this debate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a long-awaited ruling regarding the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in the chapter 11 plan of pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, "Purdue").