Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.
The United States Trustee Program is responsible for the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases throughout most of the country. Since 1986, the Trustee Program has covered all states except North Carolina and Alabama, where an Administrator Program oversees bankruptcy filings instead. Although there are many similarities between the two programs, there is a significant difference in the funding structure. The Trustee Program is entirely self-funded through quarterly fees paid by debtors that file in the Trustee Program districts.
Here’s a Bankruptcy Court opinion addressing a no-discharge claim under § 1141(d)(3) against an individual debtor who proposes a liquidating Subchapter V plan:
- RGW Construction, Inc. v. Lucido (In re Lucido), Adv. No. 21-4031, Northern California Bankruptcy Court (issued 9/13/2023, Doc. 113).
The Issue
Over the past few months, Delaware courts have continued to address important M&A and corporate issues. Significant corporate law developments have also arisen from state and federal courts in California. Below are some highlights and practical takeaways related to important developments in Delaware law.
CORPORATE
Advance Notice Bylaws and Board Action Affecting the Stockholder Franchise.
On August 24, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al. that certain syndicated term loans2 at the center of a transaction involving JP Morgan Chase and other banks were not securities under state law. While the Second Circuit did not foreclose the possibility that syndicated term loans could be securities under different circumstances,3 for now Kirschner cements the long-standing view -- following Banco Espanol de Credito v.
What rate of interest should a debtor pay under a bankruptcy plan?
Executive Summary
Investors in LMA-based intercreditor agreements1 (ICA) should be reassured by the commercial approach recently taken by the High Court in construing the "Distressed Disposal" provisions (DD Provisions).
Question
Once a Subchapter V debtor is removed from possession under § 1185(a), what happens next?
The answer to this question seems to have evolved over the few years of Subchapter V’s existence:
- from a low-power position for debtor, early-on;
- to a high-power position for debtor, in a re-thought view; and
- then back to the low-power position for debtor, when problems of the re-thought view become evident.
I’ll try to explain.
Early Answer
一、背景介绍
本案1中的被告、破产债务人美国航运公司（United States Lines Inc.，以下简称 USL）在世界各地长期经营庞大的海运业务。公司在美国特拉华州注册成立，后将业务拓展到英国，控股公司为在纽约注册的麦克莱恩工业公司（McLean Industries Inc.）。1986年，USL根据《美国破产法》第11章的规定，于11月24日提出破产申请。同日，美国纽约南区的地方破产法庭（以下简称美国破产法庭）的布施曼（Buschman）法官作出临时禁令并指定债务人托管人。USL的申请内容显示：公司资产共计12.5亿美元，总债务为12.72亿美元，负债金额超过资产的102%。而在英国，其欠下的总债务（已经清算的债务）达到243.4万英镑（包括拖欠原告的债务），资产约为72万英镑，债务超过资产的3倍，严重资不抵债。鉴于此，USL根据《美国破产法》第11章的规定进行重整，并计划完全关闭公司在英国和欧洲的运营。
The equitable mootness doctrine is before the U.S. Supreme Court on a Petition for writ of certiorari. The case is U.S. Bank National Association v. Windstream Holdings, Inc.[Fn. 1]
All who’ve seen an effort to abuse equitable mootness, from a creditor’s view, will appreciate the following information from U.S. Bank’s Petition and from a supporting Amicus Brief of law professors in U.S. Bank v. Windstream.