“A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

The Bottom Line

In one of the first applications of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the scope of section 546(e) in Merit Management, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Carey found that section 546(e)’s safe harbor did not apply to fraudulent transfers between two parties that were not financial institutions, even if the transaction passed through financial intermediaries.

What Happened

In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re MPM Silicones, LLC that the appropriate interest rate for replacement notes issued to secured creditors under a “cramdown” Chapter 11 plan must be a market rate if an “efficient market” exists. If no such market exists, however, the formula rate (effectively, the prime rate plus 1-3 percent) must be applied.

On January 15th, 2019, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the end user of an electricity forward contact was not entitled to the benefits of the safe harbor provisions under Section 556 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 556 allows a “forward contract merchant” to terminate a forward contract post-petition based on an ipso facto clause in the contract and exempts such actions from the automatic stay.

In recent years, a variety of external factors—including, regulatory costs, political headwinds, falling oil prices, and the increased utilization of natural gas—have placed significant stress on domestic coal companies. Those external factors, in conjunction with significant pension and healthcare liabilities and debt burdens, led to numerous bankruptcy filings within the coal industry.

On December 22, 2018, the federal funding for certain agencies lapsed, and the United States government entered into a partial shutdown. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), including the United States Trustee Program (USTP), was one of the agencies that shut down. United States Trustees (“UST”) representing the USTP appear and litigate in a multitude of bankruptcy proceedings. USTs also actively participate in out-of-court settlement discussions, plan negotiations, and the like.

In In re Argon Credit, LLC, et al., Case No. 16-39654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2019), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that a standby clause in a subordination agreement prevented a subordinated lender from conducting discovery on the senior lender's claim, pursuant to section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Facts

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

In In re Argon Credit, LLC, et al., Case No. 16-39654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2019), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that a standby clause in a subordination agreement prevented a subordinated lender from conducting discovery on the senior lender’s claim, pursuant to section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent decision that will be of interest to capital and structured finance market participants,1 a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York found that nonrecourse noteholders of a structured finance vehicle were not eligible petitioners under § 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore could not commence an involuntary bankruptcy case.