The United States Supreme Court unanimously[1] held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid their debt at an asset sale conducted under a so-called "cramdown" plan. RadLAX Gateway Hotels, LLC et al., v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC),__S.Ct.__ No. 11-166, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012).

The United States Supreme Court recently submitted to Congress an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 dealing with disclosure by groups of hedge funds and other distressed investors in reorganization cases. Unless Congress blocks its passage, which is unlikely, the amendment will become effective on Dec. 1, 2011.1 As shown below, the new rule streamlines and clarifies what had become a frequently litigated disclosure process.

Background

Break-up fees1 remain difficult for initial (or so-called “stalking horse”) bidders to obtain in the Third Circuit. In Kelson Channelview LLC v. Reliant Energy Channelview LP (In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP), No. 09-2074 (3d Cir. Jan.

The Administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (“LBIE”), acting as LBIE’s agent and without personal liability, have advised that they will be filing an omnibus claim on behalf of LBIE and LBIE’s customers against Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) in its liquidation proceedings under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).  

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 30, 2007, affirmed the dismissal of a lender liability class action brought by employees of a defunct originator and seller of mortgages and home equity loans. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20791 (2d Cir. August 30, 2007). Agreeing with the district court, the Second Circuit held that the lender was not an "employer" within the meaning of the Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification Act ("WARN Act"), and thus was not liable to the employees for the sudden loss of their jobs. Id., at *2.

The Third Circuit recently affirmed the bankruptcy court's approved retention of the debtor's counsel ("S") when that "law firm dropped an existing client to avoid conflicts that would prevent it from taking on a more lucrative client [i.e., the debtor]." In re Boy Scouts of America, 2022 WL 1634643, *7 (3d Cir. May 24, 2022) (BSA). According to the court, there were "not enough facts to put [the so-called "hot potato" doctrine] into play" and disqualify S under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.

"`Staggering' legal fees in Boy Scouts Bankruptcy Case." So read the title of an article in The New York Times on May 11, 2021. According to the reporter, a "lawyer negotiating a resolution to the multi-billion dollar bankruptcy filed by the Boy Scouts of America billed $267,435 in a single month. Another charged $1,725 for each hour of work. New lawyers fresh out of law school have been billing at an hourly rate of more than $600." The bankruptcy judge presiding over the case has called the fee totals "staggering," said the reporter.

“[A] secured creditor [has no] affirmative obligation under the automatic stay to return a debtor’s [repossessed] collateral to the bankruptcy estate immediately upon notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on Oct. 28, 2019. In re Denby-Peterson, 2019 WL 5538570, 1 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2019). Affirming the lower courts, the Third Circuit joined “the minority of our sister courts — the Tenth and D.C. Circuits” with its holding.

“A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

A bankruptcy court properly denied a bank’s motion to compel arbitration of a debtor’s asserted violation of the court’s discharge injunction, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 7, 2018. In re Anderson, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5703, *20 (2d Cir. March 7, 2018).