The Delaware Bankruptcy Court has confirmed that in multiple-debtor chapter 11 cases, the cramdown rules set forth in section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code must be applied on a per debtor basis as opposed to a per plan basis. See In re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, No. 11-13338 (MFW), 2011 WL 6749058 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 22, 2011) (“Jameson”) and In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (KJC), 2011 WL 5142420 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 31, 2011) (“Tribune”).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 17, 2010 held that foreign representatives appointed in a foreign insolvency proceed-ing have the authority to bring a foreign law based avoidance action in an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding commenced under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, reversing the lower court opinions.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reversed a trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the buyer at a homeowners association’s non-judicial foreclosure sale that was conducted in violation of the automatic stay in the borrower’s bankruptcy, and against a mortgagee whose interest in the foreclosed property would have been extinguished.

In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit held that a first deed of trust lienholder may set aside a completed super-priority lien foreclosure sale if the sale violates the bankruptcy automatic stay.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed the denial of bankruptcy discharge for a Chapter 7 debtor due to the debtor’s failure to keep adequate records.

In particular, the Eighth Circuit focused on a sudden and financially significant return of hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of high-end watches and jewelry that left significant unanswered questions as to the whereabouts of the assets and the legitimacy of the creditor jeweler’s claim.

In determining the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted an “objectively reasonable” standard, and held that a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, which had applied a subjective standard for civil contempt.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a debtor’s claim seeking to use a bankruptcy trustee’s § 544(a) strong-arm power to avoid a mortgage on the ground that it was never perfected did not require appellate review of the state court foreclosure judgment, and therefore was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that, where husband and wife debtors fraudulently transferred assets, the creditor was entitled to the full sum the creditor would have recovered and was not limited to the amount of the collateralized debt.

In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit reversed a bankruptcy court and trial court judgment in the creditor’s favor that the debt was non-dischargeable due to the debtor’s fraud, but improperly limiting the non-dischargeable debt to only the collateralized amount.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently held that a bankruptcy debtor’s Chapter 11 proceeding should not be dismissed as filed in bad faith to delay or avoid foreclosure, but could not confirm the debtor’s proposed plan to lease its commercial property asset to a business that generates income from medical marijuana.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that “escrow funds, insurance proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds” are protected by the anti-modification provisions for Chapter 13 bankruptcies as “incidental property” under the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in the federal Bankruptcy Code.